Gulf Arab States Press US to Neutralize Iran for Good

DUBAI — Gulf Arab states that spent years rebuilding diplomatic ties with Tehran are now pressing the United States to ensure Iran can never threaten the region’s energy lifeline again, according to three Gulf officials, five Western diplomats, and five Arab diplomats cited by Reuters on Monday. The shift marks the clearest signal yet that the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have abandoned any pretence of neutrality in the 17-day-old conflict and are urging Washington to comprehensively degrade Iran’s military capacity before hostilities end.

The demand carries enormous weight. Gulf states did not ask the United States to launch Operation Epic Fury on 28 February, when American and Israeli warplanes struck targets across Iran and killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But the Iranian retaliation that followed — more than 1,500 drones and hundreds of missiles fired at airports, ports, oil facilities, and commercial hubs across all six GCC nations — has forced a fundamental recalculation in every Gulf capital. Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Saudi-based Gulf Research Center, told Reuters: “There is a wide feeling across the Gulf that Iran has crossed every red line with every Gulf country.”

The stakes extend far beyond the region. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas normally passes, has sent Brent crude to $102 per barrel. Goldman Sachs projects GDP contractions of 14 percent for Qatar and Kuwait if the conflict persists into late April, dwarfing the pandemic’s economic damage. For Gulf leaders, the calculation is now binary: either Iran’s capacity to hold the region’s energy infrastructure hostage is permanently destroyed, or it is not.

What Are Gulf States Demanding From Washington?

The prevailing mood among Gulf leaders is unmistakable, according to a Gulf source cited by Reuters: President Donald Trump should comprehensively degrade Iran’s military capacity. The alternative, the source said, is living under a constant threat. Unless Iran is severely weakened, the source added, it will continue to hold the region to ransom.

The demand goes beyond the immediate conflict. Gulf officials are not merely asking Washington to stop the drone and missile barrages that have struck every GCC member state since 1 March. They want the United States to ensure that Tehran lacks the military hardware, launch infrastructure, and command-and-control systems to repeat its campaign once hostilities end. That means targeting not only the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ drone and missile factories but also the intelligence networks, supply chains, and proxy coordination centres that enabled Iran to sustain fire across seven countries simultaneously.

Critically, the Gulf states are not demanding regime change in Tehran. Multiple diplomatic sources told Reuters that GCC leaders recognize the dangers of a power vacuum in Iran. Their objective is more specific: the permanent degradation of Iran’s offensive military capacity, particularly its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and launch long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure. Saudi Arabia’s defence minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, has contacted counterparts across the Gulf and condemned Iran’s aggression in terms that leave little room for post-war reconciliation.

Why Gulf Leaders Abandoned Their Neutral Stance

The GCC’s pivot from diplomatic bridge-builders to advocates for military degradation did not happen overnight. For three years before the war, Saudi Arabia and its neighbours pursued a deliberate strategy of de-escalation with Tehran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman restored diplomatic relations with Iran in a Beijing-brokered deal in 2023. The UAE reopened its embassy in Tehran the same year. Oman maintained its traditional role as back-channel intermediary.

That entire diplomatic architecture collapsed in the first 72 hours of March 2026. Iran’s retaliatory strikes did not distinguish between the nations hosting American military bases and those that had sought to remain neutral. Oman, which had spent decades cultivating its status as the Gulf’s honest broker, was struck by Iranian drones that killed two people at Salalah port. Qatar, which had maintained closer ties with Tehran than any other GCC member, saw its liquefied natural gas production halted after strikes on QatarEnergy facilities — a blow that sent European gas prices surging by more than 40 percent.

As one senior Gulf diplomat told CNN, the Iranian bombardment “inexorably dragged them into a war that they had desperately hoped to avoid.” Saudi Arabia’s shift from détente to confrontation was driven not by ideology but by the physical evidence of Iranian warheads striking Saudi cities. Over 230 drones have been intercepted over Saudi territory since the conflict began, according to the Saudi defence ministry. On 16 March alone, 70 drones were shot down over Al-Kharj, the Eastern Province, and the Riyadh region.

The attack on the United States embassy in Riyadh — confirmed by Saudi authorities as causing “limited fire and minor material damages” from two Iranian drones — crossed a threshold that several Gulf officials described as irreversible. Even states that had counselled restraint now acknowledge that Iran’s campaign has made future coexistence untenable without a fundamental change in Tehran’s military capabilities.

Trump’s Counter-Pressure on Gulf Allies

The dynamic between Washington and the Gulf is not a one-way street. While Gulf states press the United States to finish what it started, Trump is pressing Gulf states to join the fight — or at least publicly endorse it.

According to three Gulf sources cited by Reuters, Trump wants visible regional backing for the US-Israeli campaign to bolster its international legitimacy and strengthen domestic support. The president has demanded that approximately seven countries, including Gulf states, send warships to help secure the Strait of Hormuz. On 16 March, Trump warned: “We will remember” which nations contributed and which did not, according to CNBC.

Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a close Trump ally, has been the most explicit in pressing Washington’s Arab partners. After visiting Israel, Graham questioned why the United States should defend allies like Saudi Arabia that refuse to participate in what he described as a shared struggle against Iran. “If they do not, consequences will follow,” Graham warned, according to Foreign Policy.

Yet Gulf states have resisted formal co-belligerent status. Saudi Arabia has maintained its strategy of calculated restraint, defending its airspace and intercepting Iranian ordnance without launching offensive operations against Iranian territory. The logic, according to analysts at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, is straightforward: joining the US-Israeli campaign would add little to Washington’s military superiority while sharply increasing the Gulf states’ exposure to Iranian reprisals.

The result is a diplomatic tug-of-war that is reshaping the US-Gulf relationship in real time. Gulf states want Iran permanently weakened but do not want to be the ones pulling the trigger. Washington wants Gulf states to share the political burden of the war but cannot afford to alienate the allies whose territory hosts American forces, refuelling aircraft, and intelligence infrastructure critical to the campaign. The largest uncommitted military force in the region remains Egypt’s 438,500-strong armed forces, whose absence from the coalition has drawn growing attention as the war enters its third week.

How Has Iran’s Military Campaign Changed the Gulf’s Strategic Calculus?

The scale and scope of Iran’s retaliation has shattered assumptions that had guided Gulf security planning for a generation. Before 28 February, the working assumption in most Gulf capitals was that Iran would calibrate any military response to avoid provoking a full-scale regional war. That assumption proved catastrophically wrong.

Iran launched missiles and drones against all six GCC members — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — as well as Jordan and Iraq. As of 16 March, the UAE alone reported that 1,627 drones and 319 missiles had been launched toward its territory, with 1,411 drones and 259 missiles intercepted. Kuwait reported 539 drones and 227 missiles. Bahrain intercepted 221 drones and 129 missiles. Qatar faced 69 drones, 180 missiles, and two manned aircraft strikes.

The indiscriminate nature of Iran’s targeting has unified the GCC in a way that decades of Saudi diplomatic effort never achieved. The fractures that had divided the bloc — over the Qatar blockade, over the pace of normalization with Israel, over relations with Turkey — have been temporarily submerged by the shared experience of Iranian ordnance falling on every member state. The six GCC members have conducted “limited consultations” since fighting began, Reuters reported, though formal coordination remains nascent.

The Economic Cost of Hormuz’s Closure

The economic argument for neutralizing Iran’s military is as powerful as the security argument. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz since early March has dealt the worst economic blow to the Gulf since the 1990-91 invasion of Kuwait.

Goldman Sachs estimated that if the conflict lasts until late April, Qatar could see its GDP contract by 14 percent — a figure 4.5 times worse than the 3.1 percent decline the country suffered during the pandemic. Kuwait faces a projected 14 percent contraction, 1.7 times more severe than its 8.1 percent COVID decline. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, which have pipeline infrastructure bypassing the strait, face contractions of 5 percent and 3 percent respectively, according to Goldman’s models.

Capital Economics suggested that regional GDPs could fall 10 to 15 percent if the conflict lasts at least three months and causes lasting damage to energy infrastructure. Daily oil exports from the Middle Eastern Gulf have dropped by at least 60 percent due to disruptions, according to Reuters data.

The costs are already materializing. Strategic oil reserves across the Gulf are being drawn down at an unsustainable pace. Iran’s selective passage policy through Hormuz — allowing Chinese vessels through while blocking others — has further complicated the picture. Brent crude has gyrated between $92 and $120 per barrel since the conflict began, settling around $102 on 16 March.

The interception costs alone are staggering. The UAE has spent an estimated $1.3 to $2.6 billion on air defense operations since the war began. Kuwait’s interception costs range from $0.8 to $1.5 billion. Qatar has spent between $0.6 and $0.9 billion, according to defence analysts. Each Patriot interceptor costs approximately $4 million, while the Iranian drones they are shooting down cost a fraction of that — an asymmetry that Gulf defence planners recognize is unsustainable.

What Happens the Day After Iran Is Neutralized?

For all the urgency of the Gulf demand, significant concerns remain about what follows the destruction of Iran’s military apparatus. Gulf officials have told multiple outlets that one reason they have not launched their own offensive strikes is their anxiety about “the day after.”

A weakened Iran without functioning central command could fracture into competing power centres, each controlling different elements of the country’s remaining military infrastructure. The IRGC’s provincial commands, Basij paramilitary networks, and proxy groups across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen all maintain independent operational capacity. Israel’s killing of security chief Ali Larijani on 17 March — the highest-ranking Iranian official eliminated after Khamenei — further complicates the command picture.

Gulf states also fear that a comprehensively degraded Iran could become a failed state on their doorstep, generating refugee flows, narcotics trafficking, and non-state armed groups that would pose different but equally serious security challenges. Iran’s population of 88 million people — more than double the combined citizen populations of all six GCC states — makes the collapse scenario particularly alarming.

The diplomatic consensus emerging in Gulf capitals, according to analysts, is that Iran should be weakened enough to be deterred but not so destroyed that it cannot govern its own territory. Achieving that balance through military force, rather than negotiation, represents one of the most complex strategic challenges of the conflict.

European Allies Refuse to Join the Hormuz Mission

The Gulf’s frustration is compounded by Europe’s refusal to contribute to the military effort. European leaders rejected Trump’s demand to help secure the Strait of Hormuz, with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stating that Berlin had no intention of joining military operations during the conflict, according to Al Jazeera reporting on 16 March.

The failure to assemble a credible international Hormuz coalition has left the United States as the only external power willing to challenge Iran’s de facto blockade. That dynamic reinforces the Gulf argument that Washington must act decisively now, because no other power is willing or able to guarantee the strait’s security in the future.

The European position is particularly galling for Gulf leaders because Europe is among the regions most affected by the Hormuz closure. European natural gas prices have surged by more than 40 percent since the conflict began, and the EU called an emergency energy meeting on 16 March as oil pushed past $106 per barrel. Yet European capitals have calculated that the political risks of joining an American military campaign in the Middle East outweigh the economic costs of inaction.

Japan and South Korea, both heavily dependent on Gulf energy imports, have similarly declined Trump’s invitation to contribute naval forces, leaving the Hormuz mission as an overwhelmingly American operation with limited international support. NPR reported on 16 March that most countries have “shown little interest in sending warships despite U.S. pressure.”

Background and Timeline

The current crisis began on 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iran under Operation Epic Fury. The strikes targeted military facilities, nuclear sites, and the leadership compound where Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed.

Iran’s response was immediate and escalatory. The IRGC launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes against Israeli cities, US bases across the Gulf and Iraq, and civilian infrastructure in every GCC member state. The IRGC Navy issued warnings prohibiting vessel passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and subsequent attacks on commercial shipping reduced tanker traffic to near zero within days.

The conflict is now in its 17th day. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is reported to have made multiple private calls to Trump urging continued strikes against Iranian military infrastructure, according to the Jerusalem Post, despite maintaining public support for diplomatic solutions. The new Iranian Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has made no public appearances, and Trump stated on 16 March that it was “unclear if he is dead or not.”

The Arab League foreign ministers invoked collective defence provisions after Iran struck eight member states. Pakistan deployed air defence systems and troops to Saudi Arabia under the terms of a bilateral defence agreement. The United Kingdom’s RAF has been actively defending Gulf airspace, while France acknowledged the death of one European soldier in the conflict.

As of 17 March, Saudi authorities have intercepted more than 230 drones over the Kingdom. Five US KC-135 refuelling tanker aircraft were damaged in an Iranian missile strike on Prince Sultan Air Base on 16 March, according to Defense News. Iran has not confirmed the killing of Larijani or other senior officials, and Tehran has rejected ceasefire overtures, according to multiple reports. The Iran war shows no signs of imminent de-escalation.

Frequently Asked Questions

What are Gulf states asking the United States to do about Iran?

Gulf states are pressing Washington to comprehensively degrade Iran’s military capacity before ending the current conflict. According to Reuters, citing Gulf and Western diplomatic sources, the demand focuses on destroying Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and launch drone and missile strikes against Gulf civilian infrastructure. Gulf leaders want permanent results, not a temporary ceasefire that leaves Iran’s offensive capabilities intact.

Why have Gulf states not joined the war against Iran themselves?

Gulf states have calculated that formally joining the US-Israeli campaign would provide little additional military benefit while dramatically increasing their exposure to Iranian retaliation. All six GCC members are defending their airspace and intercepting Iranian ordnance, but none has launched offensive strikes against Iranian territory. Analysts describe this as “calculated restraint” — defending sovereignty while avoiding escalation.

How much economic damage has the Hormuz closure caused?

Goldman Sachs projects GDP contractions of up to 14 percent for Qatar and Kuwait if the conflict persists into late April. Daily Gulf oil exports have dropped by at least 60 percent. The UAE’s air defence costs alone are estimated at $1.3 to $2.6 billion. Brent crude has fluctuated between $92 and $120 per barrel since the conflict began, with broader market instability affecting global supply chains and energy prices.

Is Trump pressuring Gulf states to formally join the war?

According to Reuters, Trump wants Gulf states to publicly endorse the US-Israeli campaign to bolster international legitimacy and domestic support. He has demanded approximately seven countries send warships to help secure the Strait of Hormuz and warned “we will remember” which nations contributed. Senator Lindsey Graham threatened “consequences” for allies that refuse to participate. Gulf states have resisted formal co-belligerent status while privately encouraging continued American strikes on Iran.

Why are European countries refusing to help secure the Strait of Hormuz?

European leaders, including Germany’s foreign minister, have explicitly rejected Trump’s demands to join military operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Despite Europe suffering surging energy prices — natural gas up more than 40 percent, oil past $106 per barrel — European capitals have calculated that the political risks of joining an American-led military campaign outweigh the economic costs. Japan and South Korea have similarly declined to send naval forces.