Iran Denies Striking Saudi Oil as Its Envoy Seeks Gulf Reset

RIYADH — Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia denied on Saturday that Tehran was responsible for attacks on the Kingdom’s oil infrastructure, telling Reuters in an exclusive interview that Iran targets only American and Israeli military assets and calling for a “serious review” of Gulf Arab relations to limit the influence of outside powers in the region. The statement from Ambassador Alireza Enayati, conducted in the Saudi capital on March 12 but published three days later, represents the most significant diplomatic signal from Tehran since the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran on February 28 — even as more than 3,100 Iranian missiles and drones have struck targets across six Gulf states in the same period.

The denial arrives at a moment of acute tension. Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery, the largest in the Kingdom, was forced to halt operations after a drone strike on March 2, according to Bloomberg. The Shaybah oil field near the UAE border has been targeted by dozens of attempted drone attacks. Yet Enayati insists he remains in “direct contact” with Saudi officials, that relations are “progressing naturally,” and that the two neighbours must find a way to coexist beyond the war. For Riyadh, the question is whether any of it can be believed.

What Did Iran’s Ambassador Say About the Saudi Oil Attacks?

Alireza Enayati, who took up his post in Riyadh in September 2023 as the first Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia since the two countries restored diplomatic ties through a China-brokered agreement earlier that year, told Reuters that Tehran bears no responsibility for the strikes on Saudi oil facilities. “Iran is not the party responsible for these attacks, and if Iran had carried them out, it would have announced it,” Enayati said in the interview conducted in Riyadh on March 12 and published on March 15, according to Reuters.

The ambassador went further, asserting that Iran’s military operations since February 28 have been confined to American and Israeli targets. He did not suggest who might be behind the oil facility strikes if not Iran, leaving a conspicuous gap in his account. Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry has itself refrained from publicly assigning blame for individual attacks, though Western intelligence agencies and independent analysts have consistently attributed the strikes to Iranian-origin drones and missiles, according to the Washington Times.

Enayati’s most striking claim was that his personal relationship with Saudi officials remains functional. He told Reuters that he maintains “direct contact” with Saudi counterparts and that bilateral relations are “progressing naturally” in several areas. He cited Saudi cooperation in facilitating the departure of Iranian pilgrims who were in the Kingdom for religious purposes when the war began, as well as the provision of medical assistance to Iranian nationals.

What Evidence Links Iran to Strikes on Saudi Energy Sites?

Enayati’s denials face a wall of evidence. On March 2, two drones struck Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery on the Kingdom’s east coast, forcing the facility — which processes more than 550,000 barrels per day — to halt operations, Bloomberg reported. The Saudi Ministry of Energy confirmed that debris from intercepted drones caused a fire at the refinery, though it was quickly contained and no injuries were reported, according to the Saudi Press Agency. The refinery resumed operations approximately one week later.

A second attack on Ras Tanura followed on March 4, with Saudi defence officials confirming another drone targeted the same facility, though it was intercepted without damage, according to Bloomberg. The Shaybah oil field, one of the Kingdom’s largest energy sites located in the remote Rub’ al Khali desert near the UAE border, has faced dozens of drone attacks since the war began, with Saudi forces destroying at least 16 drones heading toward the facility in a single engagement, according to Al Arabiya.

The pattern of strikes extends well beyond oil infrastructure. Gulf Arab states have collectively intercepted more than 3,133 Iranian missiles and drones targeting civilian areas and strategic installations as of March 13, according to Aviation A2Z, citing Gulf state defence ministry data. Saudi Arabia alone intercepted and destroyed 51 drones across the Kingdom on a single day, including in the capital Riyadh, according to the Saudi Defence Ministry. An earlier wave on March 13 saw Saudi air defences shoot down 31 drones targeting Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter.

Two people — nationals of India and Bangladesh — were killed on March 8 when an Iranian drone struck a residential building in Al-Kharj, south of Riyadh, in what the IRGC said was an attack targeting radar systems, according to Al Jazeera. The strike marked the first civilian fatalities on Saudi soil from the conflict.

How Did Saudi-Iran Relations Reach This Point?

The question of how two countries that formally restored diplomatic relations less than three years ago could find themselves in this position is central to understanding Enayati’s remarks. Saudi Arabia severed ties with Iran in January 2016 after Saudi diplomatic facilities in Tehran and Mashhad were stormed by protesters following the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Shia cleric. For seven years, the two regional powers had no formal diplomatic channels.

The breakthrough came on March 10, 2023, when Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a tripartite agreement in Beijing, brokered by China, to restore diplomatic relations and reopen embassies within two months, according to Al Jazeera. The deal was hailed as a diplomatic triumph for Beijing and a sign that the Middle East’s most combustible rivalry might finally cool. Embassies reopened by August 2023. Enayati arrived in Riyadh in September 2023, alongside Saudi Arabia’s new envoy to Tehran, Abdullah Alanazi — the first ambassadors exchanged between the two capitals since 2016.

The relationship appeared to stabilise through 2024 and into early 2025, with trade delegations, security consultations, and coordinated positions within OPEC+. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman invested considerable political capital in the rapprochement, framing it as evidence of the Kingdom’s “post-ideological” foreign policy — one driven by economic interest rather than sectarian rivalry.

The U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026, shattered what remained of that framework. Within days, Iranian missiles and drones began hitting targets across six Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. The China-brokered detente, built over years of careful negotiation, collapsed in a matter of hours.

Why Does Iran’s Denial Matter for Gulf Diplomacy?

Enayati’s denial serves multiple strategic purposes for Tehran, even if it strains credulity. By insisting that Iran targets only American and Israeli assets, the ambassador is attempting to preserve what remains of the 2023 diplomatic architecture — and to position Iran as a potential partner for the Gulf states rather than an adversary, once the war ends.

“It’s a valid question, and the answer may be simple. We are neighbours and we cannot do without each other; we will need a serious review,” Enayati told Reuters, describing his vision for post-war regional relations. He called for deeper ties among the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six member states, plus Iraq and Iran — an eight-nation framework that would exclude the United States.

“What the region has witnessed over the past five decades is the result of an exclusionary approach [within the region] and an excessive reliance on external powers,” the ambassador said, according to Al-Monitor. The implication was unmistakable: the Gulf states’ reliance on Washington for security is the root cause of instability, and Iran’s bombardment of their territory is merely a consequence of that dependence.

Enayati also referenced ongoing discussions with Riyadh regarding Saudi Arabia’s stated position that its land, sea, and airspace would not be used to stage attacks on Iran — a pledge that Tehran has demanded be formalised, according to Reuters. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly resisted being drawn into active military operations against Iran, though it hosts American military personnel and equipment on its territory.

For Gulf Arab capitals, the denial exposes a fundamental contradiction. Iran’s ambassador sits in Riyadh, holding meetings with Saudi officials and discussing pilgrim logistics, while Iranian-manufactured drones strike targets across the Kingdom. The disconnect between diplomatic language and military reality is, by any standard, extraordinary.

Gulf States Under Fire — The Scale of the Attacks

The scope of Iranian attacks across the Gulf since February 28 provides essential context for evaluating Enayati’s claims. According to data compiled by Aviation A2Z from Gulf state defence ministries, air defence systems across the six GCC member states plus Iraq have intercepted more than 3,133 missiles and drones as of March 13.

The breakdown by country, as reported by Al Arabiya, illustrates the breadth of the campaign. The UAE Ministry of Defence announced that its forces had intercepted 165 ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 541 drones. Kuwait’s air defences engaged 97 ballistic missiles and 283 drones. Bahrain intercepted 45 missiles and nine drones, including Shahed-136 kamikaze variants. Qatar reported intercepting 18 projectiles of various types.

All six GCC member states have formally condemned Iran’s attacks. The UN Security Council passed a near-unanimous resolution condemning Iran’s strikes on Gulf civilian infrastructure, though the resolution stopped short of authorising any collective military response. The Saudi Foreign Ministry warned that “if Iran presses ahead with its attacks, it would bear the heaviest diplomatic, economic, and strategic consequences, and be the biggest loser,” according to the Saudi Press Agency.

Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has publicly demanded that Gulf nations expel American military personnel from their territory, arguing that the U.S. bases make them legitimate targets. The argument has found no takers. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar all host significant American military installations.

Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic Response to the War

Riyadh has pursued a dual-track strategy since the war began: condemning Iran’s attacks in the strongest terms while refusing to participate in offensive military operations against Tehran. The approach reflects a calculation that has defined Saudi foreign policy under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — that the Kingdom’s interests are best served by maintaining maximum flexibility rather than locking itself into a single alliance structure, according to analysis from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Crown Prince held phone calls with the leaders of Turkey, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in the first week of March, expressing solidarity and coordinating defensive responses, according to the Saudi Press Agency. Britain responded by deploying RAF Typhoon jets to help defend Gulf airspace, and Pakistan dispatched air defence batteries and military personnel under a bilateral defence agreement activated for the first time.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif flew to Jeddah on March 12 for talks with the Crown Prince, expressing “full solidarity and support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in these challenging times,” according to Al Arabiya. Pakistan has deployed air defence systems and military personnel to Saudi Arabia under the terms of a bilateral defence agreement.

The Kingdom has also instructed its Gulf allies to avoid any steps that could provoke further Iranian retaliation. According to Middle East Eye, Saudi officials communicated to their GCC counterparts that no Gulf state should take military action that might be perceived as an escalation against Tehran. The message reflected Riyadh’s determination to avoid being drawn into direct conflict with Iran — a war the Kingdom did not start and does not want, even as sirens sound over its cities.

Saudi Arabia’s position is complicated by the presence of American military forces on its territory. Prince Sultan Air Base, southeast of Riyadh, hosts U.S. Air Force personnel and has been struck by Iranian missiles, according to CNN. The Al-Kharj residential area near the base was the site of the conflict’s first civilian fatalities in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has publicly pledged that its territory will not be used for offensive operations against Iran — a commitment that Enayati referenced in his interview and that Tehran has pressed to formalise.

The Kingdom’s $74.76 billion defence budget for 2026 — exceeding the combined military spending of Germany, Japan, and South Korea, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — has been tested in ways that peacetime procurement never anticipated. Saudi air defences, anchored by American-supplied Patriot missile batteries and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system, have intercepted hundreds of incoming projectiles. Yet the sheer volume of Iranian attacks has stretched these systems, raising questions about long-term ammunition supply and whether coalition support will materialise in time.

What Comes Next for Saudi-Iranian Relations?

Enayati’s interview suggests that at least some elements within the Iranian government are already thinking about the post-war diplomatic landscape. His call for a “serious review” of Gulf ties, his insistence that relations are “progressing naturally,” and his proposal for an eight-nation regional cooperation framework all point toward a long-term strategy that extends beyond the current hostilities.

Whether Riyadh is receptive remains unclear. Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry has not publicly attributed the oil infrastructure strikes to Iran — a notable omission that leaves diplomatic space for future engagement. But the Kingdom’s foreign ministry language has grown steadily harsher, and the cumulative toll of more than two weeks of drone and missile attacks on Saudi territory has reshaped the strategic calculus that underpinned the 2023 rapprochement.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to Western-allied shipping, with more than 150 vessels anchored outside the waterway, according to CNBC. Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei — who assumed the position after his father Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes of the war — has vowed to keep the strait closed, according to NBC News. Tanker rates for Very Large Crude Carriers on the Middle East-to-China route have hit an all-time record of $423,736 per day, according to CNBC.

The economic toll is mounting. Oil prices surged past $110 per barrel in the first week of the war, according to CNBC, as markets priced in the disruption to Gulf production and exports. Brent crude has remained above $100 since March 1. The International Energy Agency released a record 400 million barrels from strategic petroleum reserves to stabilise markets, the largest coordinated release in the agency’s history, according to Reuters. Saudi Arabia itself cut oil output as the Hormuz blockade backed up production into domestic storage, with Aramco redirecting exports through the East-West Pipeline to Red Sea terminals.

The war shows no sign of ending. U.S. and Israeli forces continue to strike targets inside Iran, and ceasefire efforts have gained no traction, with Washington blocking proposed talks and Tehran denying it ever sought them. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge is to survive a conflict it did not choose, protect its people and infrastructure, and position itself for a regional order that will look fundamentally different when the missiles finally stop.

Enayati’s interview, for all its contradictions, hints at one possible shape of that future: a Gulf in which external powers play a diminished role and Iran claims a seat at the table. Whether the Gulf states — battered, angry, and counting the cost — will accept Tehran’s invitation after the war is the question that will define the next decade of Middle Eastern politics.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is Alireza Enayati, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia?

Alireza Enayati is Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, appointed in September 2023 as part of the restoration of diplomatic relations brokered by China in March 2023. He was the first Iranian ambassador to serve in Riyadh since Saudi Arabia severed ties with Tehran in January 2016 following the storming of Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran.

What oil facilities in Saudi Arabia have been attacked during the Iran war?

Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery, the Kingdom’s largest, was struck by drones on March 2 and March 4, 2026, according to Bloomberg. The Shaybah oil field near the UAE border has faced dozens of drone attacks. Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry intercepted 16 drones heading toward Shaybah in a single engagement, according to Al Arabiya.

How many Iranian missiles and drones have been fired at Gulf states?

Gulf air defence systems have intercepted more than 3,133 Iranian missiles and drones since the war began on February 28, 2026, according to Aviation A2Z, citing data from Gulf state defence ministries. The UAE alone intercepted 708 projectiles, Kuwait 380, and Bahrain 54, with Saudi Arabia’s total estimated at more than 500.

What is the current status of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations?

Diplomatic relations technically remain intact — Iran’s embassy in Riyadh continues to operate, and Ambassador Enayati says he maintains direct contact with Saudi officials. However, all six GCC states have formally condemned Iran’s attacks, and the practical relationship is under extreme strain, with more than 3,100 missiles and drones striking Gulf targets since February 28.

What did Iran propose for post-war Gulf relations?

Ambassador Enayati called for a “serious review” of Gulf Arab relations that would limit the influence of external powers and foster deeper cooperation among the GCC’s six members plus Iraq and Iran. He argued that the region’s instability stems from “an exclusionary approach and an excessive reliance on external powers,” a clear reference to the American military presence in the Gulf.