KUWAIT CITY — Kuwait’s Interior Ministry announced on Wednesday the arrest of six individuals linked to Hezbollah who had confessed to planning the assassination of senior state leaders, marking the third wave of counterterrorism arrests in the Gulf state in less than two weeks and the most alarming in scope. Five of the suspects hold Kuwaiti citizenship, and all six admitted to receiving advanced military training abroad in weapons, explosives, surveillance techniques, and what Kuwaiti officials described as “assassination skills,” according to a statement released by the ministry.
The arrests bring the total number of Hezbollah-linked suspects detained in Kuwait since March 16 to at least 32, with an additional 14 individuals — including Kuwaiti, Lebanese, and Iranian nationals — identified as fugitives outside the country. The crackdown coincides with parallel operations in the UAE and Qatar, and comes as six Arab nations issued a joint statement condemning Iran-backed sleeper cells operating across the Gulf, invoking their right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Table of Contents
- What Did the Kuwait Assassination Plot Involve?
- Three Waves of Arrests in Eleven Days
- Firearms, Drones, and Assassination Weapons Seized
- How Have the UAE and Qatar Responded to Iran-Backed Cells?
- Six Arab Nations Invoke Self-Defence Rights
- Hezbollah Denies Gulf Presence as Evidence Mounts
- Why Does Kuwait Have a History of Iran-Linked Terrorism?
- What Does the Crackdown Mean for Saudi Arabia?
- Frequently Asked Questions
What Did the Kuwait Assassination Plot Involve?
The six suspects arrested on March 26 confessed to espionage and terrorist activities directed against Kuwait’s most senior government officials, the Interior Ministry said. Kuwaiti authorities stated that the cell had been planning assassination operations targeting “leaders of the state and senior officials” — a formulation that security analysts interpreted as referring to members of the ruling Al Sabah family and senior ministers.
During interrogation, all six admitted their affiliation with Hezbollah and confirmed they had been dispatched to Kuwait with specific operational orders, according to the ministry statement reported by Bloomberg and The National. The suspects acknowledged receiving training at camps linked to the Lebanese militant group, where instruction covered the use of firearms and explosives, covert surveillance methods, encrypted communications, and techniques specifically designed for targeted killings.
Kuwaiti authorities revoked the citizenship of the six suspects following their confessions. Another 14 individuals connected to the cell have been identified outside Kuwait, including nationals of Kuwait, Lebanon, and Iran, and international arrest warrants are being prepared, according to officials familiar with the investigation who spoke to Bloomberg on condition of anonymity.
The plot represents the most direct threat to Gulf state leadership uncovered since the Iran war began on February 28, escalating what had previously been described as espionage and sabotage networks into an apparent campaign of political assassination.

Three Waves of Arrests in Eleven Days
The March 26 arrests represent the third and most serious wave of counterterrorism operations conducted by Kuwait’s security services in just eleven days. Each successive operation has revealed a more sophisticated and dangerous layer of Hezbollah’s presence inside the country.
The first wave came on March 16, when Kuwaiti authorities announced the detention of 16 individuals — 14 Kuwaiti citizens and two Lebanese nationals — accused of seeking to undermine national security and recruit new members for Hezbollah operations inside the Gulf. The Jerusalem Post, citing Kuwait’s Interior Ministry, reported that the raid yielded a significant arsenal including firearms, ammunition, a specialised weapon described as designed for assassinations, encrypted communication devices including Morse code transmitters, surveillance drones, maps, narcotics, cash, and Hezbollah insignia. Video released by the ministry showed hundreds of rounds of ammunition alongside axes, daggers, knuckle-dusters, binoculars, and multiple electronic devices.
Two days later, on March 18, a second cell of 10 Kuwaiti citizens was dismantled. These suspects confessed to receiving instruction abroad at camps operated by Hezbollah, where they trained in the use of weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal. The second cell had been plotting to target vital infrastructure facilities inside Kuwait, raising concerns that Iran’s proxy network intended to combine political assassination with sabotage of critical national assets.
| Date | Suspects | Nationalities | Charges | Key Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| March 16 | 16 | 14 Kuwaiti, 2 Lebanese | Recruitment, destabilisation | Firearms, assassination weapon, drones, Morse code devices |
| March 18 | 10 | 10 Kuwaiti | Infrastructure sabotage, espionage | Confessions of Hezbollah training abroad |
| March 26 | 6 | 5 Kuwaiti, 1 other | Assassination of state leaders | Confession of assassination training, 14 fugitives identified |
| Total | 32 | 29 Kuwaiti, 2 Lebanese, 1 other | — | 14 additional suspects at large |
The pattern of accelerating arrests — from recruitment networks to infrastructure sabotage to assassination plots — suggests that Kuwaiti intelligence had been monitoring these cells for an extended period and chose to act in rapid succession once the war created operational urgency. All 32 suspects have been referred to Kuwait’s Public Prosecution.
Firearms, Drones, and Assassination Weapons Seized
The scale of the weapons cache discovered during the March 16 raids alarmed security officials across the Gulf, according to reporting by the Saudi Gazette and the Jerusalem Post. Kuwait’s Interior Ministry released video footage showing the arsenal laid out for documentation, which included multiple categories of prohibited weaponry.
Among the items seized were conventional firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition, a weapon the ministry described as specifically designed for assassinations — a term that security experts told the FDD’s Long War Journal likely refers to a suppressed or concealed firearm — and encrypted communication equipment including devices capable of Morse code transmission, suggesting the cell maintained covert channels beyond standard digital communications that would be more difficult for signals intelligence to intercept.
The discovery of surveillance drones within the cache was particularly significant. Kuwait’s security forces had not previously reported Hezbollah cells possessing drone capability inside the country, and the finding raises questions about whether the devices were intended for reconnaissance of potential assassination targets, mapping of infrastructure vulnerabilities, or both. Detailed maps seized alongside the drones appeared to identify specific locations of strategic importance, though Kuwaiti authorities did not disclose which facilities had been mapped.
Additional items including narcotics, Hezbollah flags and propaganda material, axes, daggers, knuckle-dusters, and substantial quantities of cash pointed to a cell that combined ideological commitment with operational readiness. The narcotics, several analysts noted, may have served as a funding mechanism rather than for personal use — a pattern consistent with Hezbollah’s well-documented involvement in the global drug trade, which the US Drug Enforcement Administration has identified as a significant revenue stream for the organisation.

How Have the UAE and Qatar Responded to Iran-Backed Cells?
Kuwait’s crackdown is part of a broader Gulf-wide operation against Iranian proxy networks that has seen parallel arrests in the UAE and Qatar, suggesting a coordinated intelligence-sharing effort among GCC member states.
On March 20, the UAE announced the dismantling of what it described as a “terrorist network” funded and operated by Hezbollah and Iran. According to statements carried by the Anadolu Agency, the cell had been operating inside the Emirates under a fictitious commercial cover, using business front companies to infiltrate the financial system. The UAE’s State Security apparatus accused the network of money laundering, terrorism financing, and threatening the country’s financial stability. The UAE, which has been a longstanding financial hub for Iranian businesses, had already taken the extraordinary step of shutting down the Iranian Hospital and Iranian Club in Dubai earlier in March as relations between Abu Dhabi and Tehran deteriorated.
Qatar moved even earlier. On March 3, just days after the war began, the Qatar News Agency announced the arrest of ten suspects across two cells operating for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Seven of the suspects had been assigned to conduct espionage on “vital and military facilities” inside Qatar, according to the QNA report, while three were tasked with planning sabotage operations. During interrogation, all ten admitted their affiliation with the IRGC and confirmed they had been given specific intelligence-gathering and operational objectives. Qatari authorities seized locations and coordinates of sensitive installations, specialised communication devices, and technological equipment from the suspects.
The arrests came amid a barrage of Iranian strikes on Qatar itself. Since the war began, Iran has fired three cruise missiles, 101 ballistic missiles, and 39 drones toward Qatari airspace, according to data compiled by Qatar’s Defence Ministry. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed al-Ansari stated publicly that “Qatar was surprised by these unjustified attacks,” a diplomatic formulation that barely masked Doha’s fury at being targeted by a country it had long sought to maintain back-channel relations with.
Six Arab Nations Invoke Self-Defence Rights
The cumulative weight of the arrests prompted an unprecedented joint statement on March 25 from six Arab nations — the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan — that went beyond diplomatic condemnation to explicitly invoke their legal right to military self-defence.
The full scope of the six-nation declaration extended beyond Hezbollah cells to encompass all Iranian attacks, including the invocation of Article 51 self-defense rights.
The statement condemned what it called “the destabilising acts and activities targeting the security and stability of the region’s countries, which are planned by sleeper cells loyal to Iran and terrorist organisations linked to Hezbollah,” according to the text published by the Saudi Press Agency and confirmed by Gulf News. The six nations praised their armed forces and security agencies for “confronting these threats, protecting national security, and successfully uncovering and dismantling hostile networks.”
The statement stressed that the sleeper cell activities violated UN Security Council Resolution 2817, adopted in 2026, which demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally halt aggression or threats against its neighbours, including through proxies. The six states then asserted their “full and inherent right to self-defence” under Article 51 of the UN Charter, declaring they reserved the right “to take all necessary measures to safeguard their sovereignty, security, and stability.”
The invocation of Article 51 — the same legal mechanism the United States cited to justify its initial strikes on Iran — represents a significant escalation in the diplomatic posture of the Gulf states. Legal scholars and diplomats noted that the language is deliberately calibrated to provide a formal legal basis for potential military action against Iranian proxy infrastructure, should the Gulf states choose to escalate from the supportive measures they have taken so far toward direct engagement.

Hezbollah Denies Gulf Presence as Evidence Mounts
Hezbollah has categorically denied operating cells inside the Gulf states, a position the organisation has maintained consistently even as the evidence against it accumulates. In statements carried by Al-Manar, the group’s media outlet, Hezbollah officials described the arrests as fabricated pretexts designed to justify Gulf participation in the American-Israeli war against Iran and its allies.
The denial fits a longstanding pattern. Hezbollah similarly denied involvement in the 2015 Al-Abdali weapons cache discovered in Kuwait, despite Kuwaiti courts eventually convicting multiple defendants with established ties to the organisation. The group has also denied operating in Bahrain, where authorities have dismantled multiple Hezbollah-linked cells over the past decade, and in Saudi Arabia, where the organisation was implicated in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 American servicemembers.
Western intelligence assessments have consistently contradicted Hezbollah’s claims. The US Treasury Department has designated multiple Hezbollah financial networks operating through Gulf-based businesses, and European intelligence services have documented Hezbollah recruitment activities among Lebanese diaspora communities across the GCC states. The FDD’s Long War Journal noted that the current wave of arrests suggests “the Iran war has activated cells that may have been dormant or in preparation for years.”
Iran’s own position has been ambiguous. Tehran has not commented directly on the sleeper cell arrests, preferring to focus its public messaging on what it characterises as a defensive war against American and Israeli aggression. The distinction between Hezbollah cells and IRGC cells — the former uncovered in Kuwait and the UAE, the latter in Qatar — may reflect operational compartmentalisation within Iran’s proxy network, with different organs managing different aspects of the campaign.
Why Does Kuwait Have a History of Iran-Linked Terrorism?
Kuwait’s vulnerability to Iranian proxy operations is not new. The emirate’s geography — wedged between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf — and its substantial Shia minority, estimated at 25 to 30 per cent of the citizen population, have made it a persistent target for Tehran’s network-building efforts over four decades.
The most devastating attack in Kuwait’s modern history came on June 26, 2015, when a suicide bomber attacked the Imam Sadiq Mosque in Kuwait City during Friday prayers in Ramadan. The bombing, claimed by the Islamic State rather than Iran-linked groups, killed 27 worshippers and wounded 227, according to Human Rights Watch reporting at the time. Seven defendants were sentenced to death, with five executed in 2023.
Less than two months after the mosque bombing, in August 2015, Kuwaiti security forces made a discovery that proved more directly relevant to the current crisis. At a farm near the Al-Abdali border crossing with Iraq, authorities uncovered a massive weapons cache belonging to what they designated the “Al-Abdali terror cell.” The cell comprised 26 Kuwaiti citizens, all from the Shia community, who had hidden firearms, ammunition, and explosives on the property. Kuwaiti prosecutors linked the cell to both Iran and Hezbollah, though a media gag order limited public reporting on the trial.
The Al-Abdali case triggered a diplomatic crisis between Kuwait and Iran. Kuwait recalled its ambassador from Tehran and expelled the Iranian ambassador, downgrading relations to the charge d’affaires level — precisely the kind of escalation now being repeated in 2026, but on a far larger scale.
Between 2015 and the onset of the current war, Kuwait maintained a delicate balance: publicly allied with its GCC partners while privately preserving channels to Tehran that smaller Gulf states viewed as essential for managing sectarian tensions. That balance has been shattered by the scope of the 2026 arrests, which dwarf any previous counterterrorism operation in the country’s history.
What Does the Crackdown Mean for Saudi Arabia?
Saudi Arabia’s co-signature on the six-nation joint statement signals that Riyadh views the sleeper cell threat as a direct concern for the Kingdom’s own security. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who chairs the Council of Ministers and oversees Saudi Arabia’s national security apparatus, has not commented publicly on the Kuwait arrests, but Saudi state media gave the joint statement prominent coverage.
Saudi Arabia has its own extensive history with Hezbollah and IRGC operations on its soil. The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 US Air Force personnel at a housing complex in Dhahran, was ultimately attributed to Saudi Hezbollah — a separate organisation from Lebanese Hezbollah but one that operates under Iranian direction. More recently, Saudi authorities disrupted multiple cells during the 2017-2019 period of heightened tensions with Iran, though details were rarely made public.
The current war has intensified the threat. With Iranian missiles and drones already striking Saudi territory, the prospect of simultaneously contending with covert assassination and sabotage cells inside the Kingdom adds a second front that Saudi Arabia’s military and intelligence services must address. The Kingdom’s Eastern Province, home to most of its Shia population as well as the bulk of its oil infrastructure, presents a particular challenge for internal security.
Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman has held a series of calls with Western and regional counterparts in recent weeks, including conversations with France’s Catherine Vautrin and Sweden’s defence minister, in which intelligence-sharing on proxy threats was reportedly among the topics discussed. The House of Saud views the dismantling of Iran’s clandestine networks as inseparable from the broader military confrontation — a position now codified in the joint statement’s invocation of the right to self-defence.
For the six signatory nations, the arrests have transformed the nature of the threat they face. The Iran war began as a conflict of missiles and drones launched from Iranian territory. Four weeks later, it has become a war fought inside their own borders, in their own cities, by operatives who hold their own passports.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many Hezbollah suspects has Kuwait arrested in March 2026?
Kuwait has arrested 32 individuals linked to Hezbollah across three separate operations on March 16, March 18, and March 26, 2026. An additional 14 suspects, including Kuwaiti, Lebanese, and Iranian nationals, have been identified outside the country and are being sought by authorities. The arrests represent the largest counterterrorism operation in Kuwait’s history.
What was the planned assassination target in Kuwait?
The six suspects arrested on March 26 confessed to planning the assassination of “leaders of the state and senior officials,” according to Kuwait’s Interior Ministry. Kuwaiti authorities did not publicly identify specific targets, but the formulation was widely interpreted as referring to members of the ruling Al Sabah family and senior government ministers.
Which Gulf countries have arrested Iran-linked sleeper cells?
At least three Gulf countries have announced the arrest of Iran-linked cells since the war began on February 28. Kuwait has detained 32 Hezbollah operatives, the UAE dismantled a Hezbollah financial network operating under commercial cover, and Qatar arrested 10 IRGC-affiliated suspects engaged in military espionage and sabotage planning.
What weapons were found in the Kuwait raids?
Kuwaiti security forces seized firearms, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, a specialised weapon described as designed for assassinations, encrypted communication devices including Morse code transmitters, surveillance drones, detailed maps of strategic locations, narcotics, cash, Hezbollah flags and propaganda material, axes, daggers, and knuckle-dusters during the March 16 raids.
What is the six-nation joint statement on sleeper cells?
On March 25, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan issued a joint statement condemning Iran-backed sleeper cells, citing violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2817. The statement invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting the six nations’ right to take “all necessary measures” to defend their sovereignty and security against Iranian proxy operations.

