Correction, October 12, 2026: Correction: An earlier version of this article said Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s readouts of a July 20 call between their foreign ministers described different conversations, and that the Saudi readout condemned Iranian attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan without naming Hormuz. Qatar’s readout was published on July 19, and no Saudi readout of the call could be found, so that comparison and the original headline have been removed. The article also said Qatar was a designated co-mediator of the Islamabad Memorandum and that Saudi Arabia had no role in it, but Pakistan, the mediator, credited Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt with facilitating the agreement. It wrongly listed the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure, carried out by Saudi militants, as part of Saudi Arabia’s confrontation with Iran. It gave a wrong prewar Hormuz traffic baseline of 88 ships a day, where Reuters reported 130 to 140. It gave the wrong date for Senator Lindsey Graham’s death, which was July 11. It referred to a “Persian Gulf Security Agreement” and a “Phase 2” for which no source exists, and it said Iran had formally suspended the memorandum on July 18, which no source reports. Several figures, quotes and attributions that could not be verified have also been removed, including a $6 billion Qatari custody figure, a claim of covert Saudi strikes on Iran, and statements attributed to Rubio, Chatham House, Foreign Policy and a retired Saudi general. Update: the US–Saudi civil nuclear agreement was signed on July 22, 2026.
DOHA — Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan spoke with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani about freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding — an instrument Saudi Arabia did not sign — according to Qatar’s readout, which its foreign ministry published on July 19.
Qatar’s readout put the memorandum by name at the centre of the call. A Saudi readout of the same call could not be found.
Table of Contents
What Did Qatar’s Readout Say?
Qatar’s statement, released by the Qatari foreign ministry on July 19 and published by The Peninsula on July 20, used the memorandum’s own frame. Al Thani stressed that all parties should “adhere to dialogue and diplomacy” and implement what was agreed “within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” including “guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”
Who Signed the Islamabad MOU?
The Islamabad MOU, read out on June 17 and brought into force on June 18, 2026, was signed by the US and Iranian presidents and endorsed by Pakistan as mediator. Pakistan’s prime minister credited Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt with facilitating it. Saudi Arabia is not a signatory.
The memorandum provides for an executive mechanism to monitor its implementation, and talks on a final agreement were due to begin in Switzerland, according to the text read out by a US official. It gave the parties a maximum of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent, to reach that agreement.
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How Did Qatar Become a Channel to Tehran?
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia led a coalition — with the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt — that severed all ties with Qatar and imposed a land, sea, and air blockade. The crisis lasted until January 2021, when the Al-Ula Declaration restored relations. Qatar’s current role as a mediator is partly a product of that diplomatic rehabilitation — and partly a consequence of the blockade itself, which pushed Doha to cultivate the independent relationships with Tehran, Ankara, and Islamabad.
During the blockade, Qatar rerouted flights to Africa and Europe through Iranian airspace — a dependency that became the foundation of a diplomatic relationship. Iran was among the first countries to send food supplies to Doha after the land border sealed.
For Saudi Arabia, the irony is that the country it blockaded for three and a half years is now the one urging, in its July 19 readout, that the US–Iran memorandum be implemented.
What Does Hormuz Disruption Cost Saudi Arabia?
Saudi Arabia routes the largest volume of any single state’s crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast, has a maximum capacity of 7 million barrels per day, according to the EIA. That is less than half of Hormuz’s pre-crisis throughput of 20 million barrels per day. The pipeline is a pressure valve, not a substitute.
Whatever passage the MOU had opened closed in early July, when Iran escalated its disruption campaign; on July 12 Iran said it had again closed the strait.
| Indicator | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Saudi crude flows via Hormuz (2024) | 5.5 million bbl/day | EIA |
| East-West pipeline capacity (Yanbu) | 7 million bbl/day | EIA |
Whatever moved through Hormuz after the MOU took effect moved under a framework Riyadh did not sign. When the ceasefire collapsed in July, Saudi Arabia lost the export window a second time.
Does the MOU Still Exist?
The ceasefire broke down on July 8, when three ships including the Saudi-flagged Wedyan were hit near Hormuz, CENTCOM struck more than 80 targets in southern Iran and Trump declared the ceasefire “over.” On July 18, Mojtaba Khamenei said in a written statement that repeated US breaches of the interim deal showed Trump’s signature was “utterly worthless and devoid of credibility,” according to Reuters, which reported that his whereabouts remained a mystery.
The breakdown leaves the MOU in a grey zone. The clock runs regardless of compliance — and if the 60-day window passes around August 16 without an agreed extension, the framework lapses. Khamenei’s statement attacked the deal’s credibility without, as reported, formally cancelling it. Hormuz remains disrupted.
How Many Calls Before One of Them Counts?
Saudi Arabia has conducted a series of senior diplomatic calls in the current crisis. The calls continue because the alternative is silence, and silence from a country this exposed to the MOU’s failure would be read as acquiescence.
The death of Senator Lindsey Graham on July 11 removed a senator who had called Saudi Arabia “a strategic partner” in 2015. The civil nuclear agreement Saudi Arabia negotiated with the US remained unsigned — a bargaining chip that Saudi Arabia holds but cannot play from outside the room.
The Signal and Its Reach
Each of Faisal’s calls follows the same structural logic: state a position through a party with actual access and hope it propagates inward. The relay stations rotate, but the pattern does not change. Saudi Arabia speaks to intermediaries. The intermediaries speak to the principals. What the principals do with the message is beyond Riyadh’s control.
Mojtaba Khamenei holds the veto over any MOU revival. Rubio holds the US position. Al Thani speaks for one of the governments Pakistan credited with facilitating the memorandum. So does Faisal — but Saudi Arabia did not sign it. Qatar’s role as the active defender of the ceasefire framework — and what that means for Saudi Arabia’s structural position — is examined in Qatar Holds the Ceasefire Saudi Arabia Cannot Enter.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did Qatar’s readout focus on MOU compliance language?
The readout states Qatar’s own position on the memorandum, which Pakistan credited Qatar, among others, with helping to facilitate. The text does not say whether Saudi Arabia asked for the language.
Has Saudi Arabia ever held a formal seat in US-Iran negotiations?
Saudi Arabia was not a party to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Iran agreed in Vienna with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union, and Riyadh opposed that deal. It is not a signatory to the Islamabad MOU either, although Pakistan credited it with helping to facilitate the memorandum.
What role does Oman play separately from Qatar in the Hormuz crisis?
The MOU provides for Iran–Oman talks on the strait’s future administration, according to the text read out by a US official on June 17. Muscat’s channel with Tehran on Hormuz concerns the management of the strait itself rather than the wider diplomatic track.
Could Saudi Arabia use its pending US nuclear deal to gain MOU access?
Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear agreement with the US was still unsigned as of July 20. The enrichment question overlaps with the US–Iran nuclear talks the MOU left for later — any Saudi enrichment programme alters the regional nuclear balance those talks are meant to stabilise. This gives Riyadh a potential bargaining chip: conditioning its nuclear deal on US support for Saudi inclusion in MOU proceedings.
