Correction, November 1, 2026: The page's search description still said the IRGC cited the Darkhovin nuclear plant as its reason and that this was the third strike on the same facility; both claims were removed from the article on October 12 as unverified (see the editor's note below), and the description now matches the article.
MANAMA — The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed on July 21 that it struck and destroyed Amazon Web Services’ data center in Bahrain with cruise missiles, in what it called retaliation for recent US strikes on Iran. The claim came two days after Iran said the US struck the site of its Darkhovin nuclear power plant. It was carried by Iran’s state news agency IRNA, with no immediate comment from Bahrain, the United States or Amazon, and it follows Iranian drone and missile strikes that damaged AWS data centers in Bahrain and the UAE in March and April.
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The IRGC packaged the data center strike alongside claimed hits on US air-defense radar at Muharraq and a Patriot battery at Riffa, treating Amazon’s commercial cloud as operationally equivalent to the military systems defending Bahrain’s airspace. For Saudi Arabia, linked to Bahrain by the King Fahd Causeway, the targeting logic the IRGC applied to a building across that causeway now covers every piece of US-branded digital infrastructure in the Gulf.

Table of Contents
The Wave 24 Strike Package
The IRGC said its forces “targeted central data infrastructure belonging to US technology company Amazon in Bahrain with cruise missiles,” as part of the 24th wave of Operation Nasr-2, and its Aerospace Force claimed the Amazon infrastructure “had been destroyed.” The statements were carried by IRNA on July 21, 2026.
The AWS claim was not isolated. IRNA reported that the same wave included a strike on a US radar station at Muharraq and a combined missile-and-drone attack on a US Patriot air-defense system at Riffa — both in Bahrain. The combination matters: by claiming hits on air-defense installations and the commercial target in a single operation, the IRGC treated a data center as a military-grade objective warranting the same operational planning it applied to radar and interceptor batteries.
The claim could not be independently verified.
What Happened at Darkhovin?
The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said the Darkhovin nuclear power plant site was struck by several projectiles at about 3:39 a.m. local time on July 19, 2026, and attributed the attack to the United States. The IRGC’s AWS claim came two days later.
Darkhovin is a planned 360-megawatt nuclear power plant in Khuzestan province, roughly seventy kilometres south of Ahvaz on the Karun River. Iranian state television announced in December 2022 that work had begun, with an expected eight-year build costing about $1.5 to $2 billion. The IAEA said the facility was in the “very early stages of construction” and that no nuclear material was present at its most recent inspection, so the attack likely posed no radiological risk.

If Wave 24 was retaliation for Darkhovin, it introduces a different principle. Under it, any US strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure — regardless of the site’s operational status or radiological content — would justify retaliatory strikes on US commercial infrastructure anywhere in the Gulf.
How Many Times Has AWS Bahrain Been Struck?
The July 21 claim is not the first attack on AWS in the Gulf. Iranian drone and missile strikes damaged AWS data centers in the UAE and Bahrain regions in March and April 2026, AWS advised customers to migrate to other regions, and both regions were listed as unavailable from March 1. If the July claim is accurate, the Guard struck a facility that had already been damaged in the spring, and the campaign has moved from damage and disruption to claimed destruction.
The IRGC’s Expanding Commercial Target List
The AWS strikes did not emerge from an improvised targeting decision. Iran claimed the data centers hosted US military workloads — a dual-use rationale under which a commercial cloud provider becomes a military objective.

What Does This Mean for Saudi Arabia’s Cloud?
Saudi Arabia’s direct exposure to the Bahrain strikes is a consequence of timing. AWS has announced plans for further regions and Availability Zones in the kingdom, but an announced region is not the same as a completed migration. Enterprises that built workloads on ME-South-1 in Bahrain cannot relocate them to a Saudi region with a configuration change, and the war began while that dependency remained.
The IRGC framed its target as the infrastructure of a US technology company — though the assumption that Chinese or other non-American infrastructure would remain permanently exempt from the same targeting carries its own category of geopolitical risk.
Background
Operation Nasr-2 is the IRGC’s designation for its retaliatory campaign against US military and commercial infrastructure across the Gulf. By July 21 it had reached its 24th declared wave, which also claimed targets in Kuwait. The July 21 strikes coincided with the US strike campaign on Iran and the Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping declared on July 20.
Frequently Asked Questions
Has Amazon confirmed the July 21 strike on its Bahrain data center?
No. As of publication, there had been no comment from Amazon, Bahrain or the United States on the IRGC’s July 21 claim, which could not be independently verified. Because the Bahrain region had already been damaged in the spring, the facility may have been under repair, partially operational, or offline when the July attack was claimed.
Why can’t workloads simply move out of Bahrain?
Workloads built on the Bahrain region are architected for Bahrain’s specific Availability Zones, compliance certifications, and network peering arrangements — migrating them to a Saudi region requires re-architecture, re-certification, and contract renegotiation, a process that takes far longer than a configuration change.
What is the difference between a drone strike and a cruise missile strike on a data center?
The spring 2026 attacks on AWS facilities were drone and missile strikes. Drones carry small warheads — enough to damage exterior structures, trigger fires, and disrupt power systems, but not usually to destroy hardened infrastructure in a single pass. Cruise missiles carry much larger warheads and can penetrate reinforced structures. If the July claim is accurate, the move to cruise missiles would suggest the IRGC wanted permanent degradation of the target rather than disruption.
Could the IRGC target American cloud facilities in Saudi Arabia?
The IRGC’s July 21 statement described its target as infrastructure belonging to a US technology company — a description that would fit any American-owned cloud facility in the kingdom. Riyadh is within reach: Iranian missiles and drones targeted Riyadh and the Eastern Region from February 28, and US troops at Prince Sultan Air Base were wounded in a week of attacks in March.
Editor’s note, October 12, 2026: An earlier version of this article quoted an IRGC statement directly tying the Amazon strike to the Darkhovin nuclear plant, described the claimed strike as the first use of cruise missiles against cloud infrastructure and the third attack on the same facility, and gave a detailed history of earlier strikes, an IRGC list of eighteen targeted US companies, AWS service figures and Saudi cloud-region dates that we could not verify. We have replaced the quotation with the IRGC wording carried by IRNA, which described the operation as retaliation for recent US strikes, noted that Iran’s atomic energy organisation reported the Darkhovin site was struck on July 19, corrected the IAEA’s description of the site, and removed the unverified figures and claims.
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